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CONFLICT OF LAWS
USURY-SELECTION OF LAWS GOVERNING
Arkansas. In the case of Jones v. Tindall' an agent of Tindall
traveled into Arkansas and carried on preliminary discussions with
Jones regarding the making of a loan. Jones thereafter went to
Memphis, Tennessee, and signed a series of promissory notes,
payable in Tennessee, and a deed of trust conveying his 40-acre
farm as security for the notes. Though the notes were executed in
and were payable in Tennessee, they contained the following pro-
vision:
"The property herein described being located in the State of Arkan-
sas, this deed of trust and the notes and indebtedness hereby secured
shall, without regard to the place of contract or of payment, be con-
strued and enforced according to the laws of the State of Arkansas,
and with reference to the laws of which state the parties to this agree-
ment are now contracting."
Jones later refused to make payment on the ground that the notes
were in excess of the amount he actually owed. Tindall brought
suit to foreclose the deed of trust, and the chancery court rendered
a decree in his favor.
In reversing the decree of the chancery court the Supreme Court
of Arkansas held the notes to be usurious according to the law of
Arkansas. It was ruled that the parties could properly select the
law of Arkansas to govern their contract, as Arkansas was the
domicile of the borrower, situs of the security, and place where
preliminary negotiations were conducted. While the decision in
this case may be in accord with Arkansas authority,2 it is opposed
to the attitude of most courts which will not deem a transaction
usurious if there is some ground on which that result may be
1216 Ark. 431, 226 S. W. 2d 44 (1950).
2 McDougall v. Hachmeister, 184 Ark. 28, 41 S. W. 2d 1088 (1931); Lanier v.
Union Mortgage, Banking & Trust Co., 64 Ark. 39, 40 S. W. 466 (1897). Both of these
cases cited the same rule of law as the principal case, but its application resulted in
upholding the validity of the contracts in question, whereas the result in the principal
case was to invalidate the contract.
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avoided.3 These courts hold that the parties intend to enter into
a valid contract and that its obligations should be enforced if the
contract satisfies the law of any state with which it has a substantial
connection.4 This rule has been applied to uphold contracts even
though the parties have expressly stipulated that the contract
should be controlled by the laws of a state where usury would
be found! In the principal case, however, the Arkansas court held
that the parties could select the law by which their contract would
be governed, although the application of the law invalidated the
very contract into which they had entered.
ENFORCEMENT OF VOID FOREIGN JUDGMENTS
Oklahoma. In the case of Kennedy v. Chadwell6 plaintiffs had
been attorneys for the children of the defendant in an action in
California against their father. The California court had rendered
judgment that the defendant make payment of attorney's fees direct
to the attorneys. Plaintiffs brought suit in Oklahoma to recover on
this foreign judgment. The Oklahoma court, in rendering judg-
ment for defendant, held that, in the absence of statutory authority,
the California court could not order payment of the fees direct
to the attorneys. The court cited several California cases7 which
held such a judgment void for lack of jurisdiction notwithstand-
ing the failure of the losing party to appeal therefrom. Since the
judgment would have been held void in California, the Supreme
Court of Oklahoma refused to enforce the judgment. This decision
is in accord with American authority to the effect that if a judg-
ment is not valid in the state in which it is entered, it should not
be valid elsewhere.8
3 See Recent Cases, 79 U. Pa. L. Rev. 494 (1931).
4 STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d ed. 1951) 237.
5 Brierly v. Commercial Credit Co., 43 F. 2d 730 (3d Cir. 1930). Defendant was a
Delaware corporation which contracted in Maryland to buy accounts receivable from
a corporation in Pennsylvania. It was stipulated that the contract would be governed
by the law of Delaware, but the court enforced the contract under Maryland law, since
under Pennsylvania and Delaware law the contract was usurious.
------------ Okla ------------- 215 P. 2d 548 (1950).
7 Stevens v. Stevens, 215 Cal. 702, 12 P. 2d 432 (1932) ; Garra v. Superior Court,
58 Cal, App. 2d 588,, 137 P. 2d 31 (1943) ; Pennell v. Superior Court, 87 Cal. App.
375, 262 Pac. 48 (1927) ; Chavez v. Scully, 62 Cal. App. 6, 216 Pac. 46 (1923).
s STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d ed. 1951) 114-115. Extra-territorial effect of a
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English doctrine, as expressed in Pemberton v. Hughes,9 is to
the contrary, and the jurisdiction of a foreign court will only be
examined to determine the power of the court to entertain the type
of case in question and to require the defendant to appear. This
doctrine, if generally accepted, would lead to the result that a
judgment would be valid everywhere except in the jurisdiction in
which it was entered.10
AUTOMOBILES-VALIDITY OF FOREIGN MORTGAGES
Texas. In Bank of Atlanta v. Fretz" an automobile had been
purchased for cash by Harris from an automobile dealer in Geor-
gia. Harris at a later date executed a bill of sale and a chattel
mortgage covering this automobile to the Bank of Atlanta to secure
his promissory note. The mortgage was properly filed for record
in Georgia, and the bank acquired a valid lien in that state. There-
after Harris, without the knowledge or consent of the bank, drove
the automobile to Texas and applied for a certificate of title, fraud-
ulently representing that no liens existed against the automobile.
On the same day he sold the automobile to defendant Fretz and
delivered to him an assignment of the application for a certificate
of title. Defendant Fretz, without actual knowledge of the exist.
ing lien, applied for and received a certificate of title from the
Texas Highway Department. Fretz then sold the automobile to
defendant Sweiven, who also had no knowledge of the lien and
who applied for and received a certificate of title from the Texas
Highway Department. The Bank of Atlanta brought action to fore-
close the mortgage lien on the automobile, but foreclosure was
judgment should depend upon its effect where entered. If, in spite of error, it is valid
there, it should be valid in other states.
9 68 L. J. Ch. 281, 1 Ch. 781 (1899). The question before the court was one of rec-
ognition of a Florida divorce decree. In the proceedings, summons was made one day
less than the required period before appearance. Under Florida law the decree was
void. The English court held it was not subject to attack in England as the jurisdic.
tional requirements under the rules of conflict of laws had been satisfied. If these rules
are satisfied, the English courts will not look to the ultimate validity of the judgment
in the state where it was first entered.
10 STUMBERG, CONFLICTS OF LAWS (2d ed. 1951) 115.
11 148 Tex. 551, 226 S. W. 2d 843 (1950), rev'g 221 S. W. 2d 297 (Tex. Civ. App.
1949).
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denied by the trial court and the court of civil appeals. On appeal
the Supreme Court of Texas reversed the lower court and held that
the foreign mortgage of the Bank of Atlanta was superior to the
title acquired at a later date by an innocent purchaser in Texas.
While the decision in the principal case is in accord with the
general rule, 2 it is a complete reversal of the so-called "Texas
doctrine." It has long been held in Texas that where a mortgaged
automobile was brought into the state and was purchased by an
innocent purchaser, the owner of the mortgage lien was not pro-
tected although the mortgage had been duly filed and was valid in
the state where it was given."3 The Texas court, was strongly influ-
enced by the weight of authority elsewhere 4 and by the Certificate
of Title Act. 5
The court stated that the purpose of the act was to prevent the
importation of stolen automobiles into Texas and to prevent the
sale of encumbered automobiles without disclosure of encum-
brances to the purchaser. In requiring liens to be recorded on the
certificate of title, the purpose of the Legislature was to cover
sales of, and liens upon, motor vehicles in Texas, and not to invali-
date liens acquired in other states. If the Legislature had intended
to invalidate liens acquired in states not having certificate of title
laws, it could have stated that such liens would be forfeited when
the vehicle reached the hands of an innocent purchaser in Texas.
While the court emphasized the fact that the automobile was
removed without the knowledge or consent of the lienholder, its
12 RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) § 265 et seq.; GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF
LAWS (3rd ed. 1949) 470. Questions of title to chattels are generally recognized to be
governed by the law at the situs. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) § 268. The
interest of a lienor in a chattel will not be defeated by acquisition by another in another
state if the chattel was wrongfully removed to that state. STuMBERc, CONFLICT OF LAWS
(2d ed. 1951) 393.
13 Consolidated Garage Company v. Chambers, 111 Tex. 293, 231 S. W. 1072 (1921);
Farmer v. Evans, 111 Tex. 283, 233 S. W. 101 (1921). These cases established the
"Texas doctrine" that, to be valid, the mortgage had to be recorded in Texas. The
doctrine was based on the court's construction of VERNON'S SAYLEs' TEX. Civ. STAT.
1914, arts. 5654, 5655 (now TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) arts. 5489 and 5490).
14 General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Nuss, 195 La. 209, 196 So. 323 (1940);
Metro Plan, Inc. v. Kotcher-Turner, Inc., 296 Mich. 400, 296 N. W. 304 (1941); see
Lee, Conflict of Laws Relating to Installment Sales, 41 Mich. L. Rev. 445 (1942); 10
Am. JuR., Chattel Mortgages, § 21, p. 729.
15 TEx. PsN. CODE (Vernon, 1948) art. 1436-1.
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